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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	
CLASSIFICATION	
Classified	Declassified to <i>Secret</i>
BY A	DATE 10-1-59-207
U	SECRET
Date	6 July 59
24 March 1952	

MEMORANDUM TO: []

SUBJECT: Operational Plan for 1952 - Dated 19 February 1952

REFERENCE: 1151-CACWU; 1182-CACWU

1. [] plan was somewhat delayed in writing as the field was under the mistaken impression during the winter that further policy guidance was needed before their plans could be finalized (i.e., [] felt his directions might be changed thereby altering his plan). Nonetheless, no damage, except possible delays in obtaining clearances, has resulted and in all probability this represents a fairly current version of the plan which would not be the case if the plan were written in December as some of the basic conditions have altered (for example: Postponement of Willow). Furthermore postponement has allowed [] to assess the situation more thoroughly and plan more realistically and possibly in more detail.

2. General Comment. This schedule is admittedly ambitious, varied within the objectives of the project and consonant with the decision reached

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in Rome and

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in Rome and affirmed in London. It certainly gives me the feeling that

[] has confidence in his capabilities and has resources. In comparison with our plans and activities in prior years this plan reflects growth in assets and thinking. What remains, of course, is to successfully implement all of this plan. Another point of interest to me is to observe the varied lines of attack at our disposal. Opportunities are not dead nor are all available opportunities exploited as yet. My philosophy would be to develop this plan and have a reserve of agents in readiness to exploit to the hilt the avenues which open up when pricked. Despite our miserable failures in the past I think that some individuals have tended to sell the project short and have adopted the attitude that we will never get anything of any amount underway inside Albania. Although there are strong arguments for this point of view, I believe [] has fared up to the facts in a reasonably realistic fashion and his altered approach as presented in 1151-CAC U will give us ample opportunity to prove a basis exists for clandestine activity inside Albania.

3. Specific Comment.

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3. Specific Comment.

March. A BCBEGOOD mission accomplished 27 February but radio
leaflet will be postponed until May or later. It is being replaced
by the leaflet suggested to [] in Washington for the Workers
Congress provided all arrangements run smoothly.

~~April.~~ B No comment - Note arrival assessment team delayed until
end of month.

APRIL

a. This type of operation conceived in the first place to provide
a direct source of raw material for HTGENUBBY may very likely feature
1952 activities as it is entirely possible that the nets established
by Willow and similar teams may develop into a great deal more than
simple intelligence gathering mechanisms. I believe one of Wagner's
recent dispatch discusses the possibilities as I see them.

b. It appears that this operation is developing on schedule.

[] will return with full details. However, I am
under the distinct impression two separate missions will be staged.

c. No comment. Would

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c. No comment. Would be fine if Dosti's second message were ready by this time.

d. The operation which is outlined in sketchy fashion at best in 1099-CACWU is obviously one of our most important undertakings.

[]ust arrange with Security to insure these men are cleared for BCFIELD activities. If I am not mistaken, a dispatch must be initiated immediately asking for BIO information on one of these three men; at that time it would be well to request further information on the operation. I have a hunch that [] believes Pine is either (a) completely lost and not worth bothering with or (b) capable of taking care of itself and will turn up in the Albanian Alps at the direction of Muharem Bajraktari. F.Y.I. I understand overland operations via Yugoslavia will not be permitted because of "other" matters pending with the Yugoslavs.

May

a. Sounds ideal. Hope this team can be properly trained in sabotage techniques. We had best look into the thermite weld RAD device.

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b. [] will very likely have details. We received word of this operation as an attachment to the letter [] hand carried to [] for [] in January. It was in the form of a copy of a note to the British. It should be dug out and put into the 1952 operations file.

c. Does anyone understand the meaning of the word final?

June - July

- a. This does not sound very specific to me. Team Make up?
- b. A tricky operation. The possibility always looms of an HTNEIGH man or [] etc. turning up in the Tiber as these people can play nasty outside the homeland as well as inside. Nevertheless, we should all be alert to spot opportunities of similar nature as we read the mass of material in our In boxes.
- c. Key lies in finding the right person. Just the type operation we should be capable of mounting.
- d. This operation definitely fits into the scheme and its detailed plan augurs well for its success. Note the age of the principal agent.
- ~~TOP SECRET~~ 4. I feel []

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4. I feel [] refusal to make specific plans beyond July and his comment on flexibility in the last paragraph shows good judgment. I have hopes we will be up to our ears in operations by that time.

5. I can not do out the arrangement about leaflet drops but would be more than willing to see the British assume full responsibility provided we could get some guarantees. The multilith leaflets would be excellent provided [] can get clearance on texts easily.

6. I feel sympathetic to [] intention to deemphasize air drops. 1951 operational reports bear out the shortcomings of air drops particularly in as tightly controlled country as Albania.

7. As the cryptonyms assigned to our agents are rather widely used I would suggest obtaining more of the same for the new men.

8. It is interesting to observe how completely NCFA is cut out of 1952 operations.

9. Re maps and files. I feel our practice of ^{of} mapping the various operations and keeping a close account is a sound one, and we should continue this policy as well as maintaining a situation ~~map~~ covering all teams currently operating

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teams currently operating plus a small map depicting all 1952 operations.

Obviously our newly established file system will come into its own.

Another necessary scrap of paper is the agent list which should tie in exactly with the card file. I am anxious to know at a glance at all times how many men we have on tap and the basic facts on each one.

10. There are obviously a number of points (which the reference) pertaining to 1952 BGFEND operations, omits because of its nature as an outline.

Nonetheless, I will include a few points to bear in mind when you are considering this so you will realize some of the other factors. In the last paragraph (I believe should be taken into account) acknowledges changes in Albania itself ^{or} in our policy toward Albania would alter

his plan. One must go beyond that and attempt to anticipate the factors which might produce these changes. Can we control them or should our efforts be directed to produce these changes? Might change in U. S. policy take the form of a gentle request from powers that be to do something spectacular and concrete in Albania? [] is of the opinion such a

request is not beyond the realm of possibility which would, of course,

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mean complete revision of our existing plan. Have the Soviets lost the initiative the world over? What of Yugoslav plans? What of British undertakings? What effect will reconstitution of NCFA have on our operations, if accomplished? What of OSO operations? What of U. S. operations, if merger OSO/OPC Albanian desks accomplished? The foregoing is but a sample ~~list~~ but if we are to approach our operations intelligently we must consider them within this broad framework and with frequent reference to the Country Plan.

11. From my viewpoint I anticipate some successful operations in 1952 but feel that overthrow of Hoxha and establishment of an acceptable government (the goal to my mind) is dependent upon resolution of a series of important roadblocks which we are not equipped or directed to deal with. Outstanding, of course, is the Yugoslav menace. Nonetheless, we must all strive to do everything possible to bring success to the program set out for the project. Would appreciate your comments, recommendations and views on 1952 BGFIND operations and this paper.

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